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Abstract
This paper develops a recent line of economic theory seeking to understand public goods
economies using methods of topological analysis. Our first main result is a very clean charac-
terization of the economy’s core (the standard solution concept in public goods). Specifically,
we prove that a point is in the core iff it is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and the set of
points it dominates is path connected.
While this structural theorem has a few interesting implications in economic theory, the main
focus of the second part of this paper is on a particular algorithmic application that demonstrates
its utility. Since the 1960s, economists have looked for an efficient computational process that
decides whether or not a given point is in the core. All known algorithms so far run in exponential
time (except in some artificially restricted settings). By heavily exploiting our new structure,
we propose a new algorithm for testing core membership whose computational bottleneck is the
solution of O(n) convex optimization problems on the utility function governing the economy. It is
fairly natural to assume that convex optimization should be feasible, as it is needed even for very
basic economic computational tasks such as testing Pareto efficiency. Nevertheless, even without
this assumption, our work implies for the first time that core membership can be efficiently tested
on (e.g.) utility functions that admit “nice” analytic expressions, or that appropriately defined
ε-approximate versions of the problem are tractable (by using modern black-box ε-approximate
convex optimization algorithms).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background on Public Goods Economics
A basic question in economics is to understand the forces governing the production of
public goods. A good is public if its use by one person does not reduce its availability
to others, and if none are excluded from using the good. Examples include public parks,
research information, a clean environment, national defense, radio broadcasts, and so on.
Public goods economies were first explicitly abstracted in a classic paper by Samuelson
in 1954 [28], and have since become central objects of study for economists. An important
feature of public goods economies is that they are not well modeled by the individualistic
“best-response dynamics” which govern familiar economic equilibrium concepts such as the
Nash or Walrasian equilibrium. Rather, public goods typically arise as the result of a
communal process – e.g. negotiations, treaties, or taxes – that allow the cost of production to
be amortized over all agents that stand to benefit from the good. Accordingly, public goods
economics inspired the development of cooperative game theory, which seeks to understand
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XX:2 Testing Core Membership in Public Goods Economies
these cooperative dynamics and when an agreement to produce public goods is “stable” or
when it is doomed to fall apart.
What, exactly, does “stability” mean in this context? The most standard notion is
coalitional stability, which is given as follows:
I Definition (Informal). Let a be an outcome in a public goods economy with agents N (i.e.
a describes the amount of work each agent contributes to produce a public good). We say
that a′ is a deviation on a for a nonempty coalition of agents C ⊆ N if no agents in N \ C
perform work (i.e. a′i = 0 for all i /∈ C) and all agents in C prefer a′ to a. If there is no
deviation on a for any coalition, then we say a is coalitionally stable. The set of coalitionally
stable outcomes is called the core of the economy.
Since its inception in the late 1800’s [13],1 the core and cooperative game theory in general
have played major roles in many successful economic research programs. More background
can be found in most modern game theory textbooks, e.g. [26, 11].
1.2 (Non-)Algorithmic Properties of Public Goods Economies
An inherent conceptual drawback of coalitional stability is its exponential-size definition.
In other words, for an outcome a to be coalitionally stable, every single one of the 2n − 1
possible coalitions of agents must not have a deviation. Hence, the naive algorithms for
testing the coalitional stability of a must perform computations for all 2n − 1 coalitions,
and so they suffer exponential runtime. Coalitional stability is not a very convincing so-
lution concept if its implicit notion of “instability” assumes that agents can quickly make
exponential time computations in order to find deviations whenever they exist.
This problem has led economists studying public goods to seek more clever methods for
solving computational problems related to the core of a public goods economy, which avoid
this exponential behavior. Some of the initial work in this vein attacked the closely-related
problem of simply outputting any core outcome. The first such solution appeared in the
1960s, when Scarf [29] proved that “balanced” games have nonempty cores, by means of
an (exponential time) algorithm that outputs a core point and provably always terminates.
Similar results were proved in the setting of public goods economies by Chander and Tulkens
[8] and Elliot and Golub [15]. Meanwhile, followup work has suggested that the slow runtime
of Scarf’s algorithm may be inherent to the problem: Kintali et al [23] showed that Scarf’s
algorithm cannot be improved to polynomial runtime (unless P = PPAD), and Deng and
Papadimitriou [12] showed that it is NP Complete just to detect whether or not the core is
empty (let alone find a point in the core), even in the simple class of graphical games, and
even when Scarf’s assumption of “balance” is dropped. Other notable hardness results in
this vein have come from Conitzer and Sandholm [10] and Greco et al [21].
There has also been considerable prior work on the “membership testing” problem of
determining whether a point taken on input is in the core (this is the question addressed
in this paper). Deng and Papadimitriou’s work [12] also implies that membership testing is
NP hard even in the restricted setting of graphical games, although there are straightfor-
ward efficient algorithms in the further restricted setting where the game is superadditive.
Conitzer and Sandholm [9] showed that membership testing is co-NP complete in games
where coalition values have a “multiple-issue” representation in polynomial space. Faigle et
1 Some of the early work on cooperative game theory used the name contract curve instead of core. The
term core was coined in [18].
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al [16] showed that the problem is NP complete in a variant of graphical games where payoffs
are given by minimum spanning trees of subgraphs. Sung and Dimitrov [31] showed co-NP
completeness for membership testing in “hedonic coalition formation games.” Goemans and
Skutella showed NP completeness for both emptiness and membership testing in “facility
location games,” and gave formulations of these problems as LP relaxations [19]. There
has been work on games defined by marginal contribution nets (MC-nets) [22, 14], in which
values attainable by coalitions are determined by succinct logical formulae. Li and Conitzer
[25] studied emptiness testing and membership testing under various classes of formulae,
and obtained various algorithms or NP hardness results depending on the complexity of the
formulae allowed.
1.3 Our Results
A recently popular trend in public goods research has been to model economies as net-
works, and then seek to analyze the economy by studying the topological properties of the
underlying “benefits network,” describing the ability of agents to transfer utility to each
other at any given point (see for example [3, 5, 1, 2, 15]). Much of the initial work focused
on Nash equilibria [3, 5, 1, 2] of the economy. A major stride was recently taken by Elliot and
Golub [15], who extended the theory to show that the Lindahl equilibria2 of an economy are
precisely the points that are eigenvalues of their own benefits network. They further discuss
connections between the Lindahl equilibria and the core – in particular, in any standard
model (including theirs) all Lindahl equilibria are also core outcomes [17]. However, they
raise an interesting open question to more precisely characterize the core [20] in a similar
vein.
Our first main result achieves this goal. We show that the core can be characterized as
follows:
I Theorem 1. Let a be an outcome in a public goods economy and let Da be the set of
points that no agent prefers to a. Then a is in the core if and only if it is Pareto efficient,
individually rational, and Da is path connected.
(Here, the definition of path connectedness is the standard topological one: for any two
points x,y ∈ Da, there is a continuous function f : [0, 1]→ Rn≥0 satisfying f(0) = x, f(1) =
y, and f(λ) ∈ Da for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. The image of [0, 1] under f is called a path.)
An interesting consequence of this theorem is a precise description of the relationship
between Lindahl equilibria and core outcomes:
I Theorem 2. Assuming that the utility function u is differentiable, the Lindahl equilibria of
a public goods economy are precisely the core points whose core membership can be certified
using only local information.
The proof of this corollary is essentially immediate by combining Theorem 1 with a more
technical phrasing of Elliot and Golub’s result.
While we believe that these two structural theorems hold intrinsic interest, the second
half of this paper is intended to demonstrate their power by an application to the algorithmic
problem discussed earlier. We have previously suggested the intuition that the algorithmic
2 The Lindahl equilibria of an economy are the competitive equilibria that would be reached if market
externalities were truthfully reported and then bought and sold on an open market. A formal definition
is not necessary to read this paper, but can be found in e.g. [26, 11].
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core membership testing problem is hard because the naive algorithms must check an expo-
nential number of coalitions for a potential deviation. However, Theorem 1 lets us avoid this
brute-force behavior: after checking for Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (which is
quite easy), we are left only with the task of checking whether or not Da is path-connected.
The complexity of this task is non-obvious, but we show that it can be done fairly efficiently,
yielding the following result:
I Theorem 3. Given an outcome a in an n-agent public goods economy, there is an algorithm
that decides whether or not a is in the core of a public goods economy. The computational
bottleneck in this algorithm is the solution of O(n) convex programming problems on the
utility function of the economy.
Hence we essentially have the first polynomial-time tester for coalitional stability in an
unrestricted public goods economy, up to the implementation of the necessary convex pro-
gramming oracle. It is fairly natural in our economic metaphor to assume that convex
programming should be tractable: it corresponds to the negotiation process of a group of
agents trying to determine how well they can maximize a joint utility function as a group.
If even this is impossible, then it is essentially hopeless to efficiently test core membership.
One cannot even test the more basic property of Pareto efficiency, a necessary step towards
testing core membership, without assuming some computational power along these lines.
Even so, if one does not wish to introduce such assumptions, Theorem 3 implies that
several broad special cases of membership testing have efficient algorithms. The most obvious
of these is when the utility function and its derivative can be described by a “nice” analytic
function on which the standard derivative-based method for exact convex optimization goes
through. Less obviously, if convex optimization really is hard for the given utility function
(or the utility function of the economy is unknown), one can employ modern ε-approximate
convex optimization solvers, which treat the utility function as a black box that can be
queried, to solve certain natural ε-approximate relaxations of the core membership testing
problem. We discuss this point in the conclusion of the paper, since it is easier to be specific
here once the economic model is familiar.
We consider it somewhat surprising that these algorithmic results are possible, given a
general dearth of positive results in the area. Moreover, the approach taken by the algorithm
is fairly intuitive and seems to plausibly reflect practical behavior. Starting with the grand
coalition, we show (via Theorem 1) that we can either determine that the current coalition
has a deviation, or we can identify a “least-valuable player” who is formally the least likely
agent to participate in a deviation. We then kill this agent and repeat the analysis on the
survivors. After n rounds, we have either killed every agent (and thus determined that the
given point is coalitionally stable), or we have explicitly found a surviving coalition with a
deviation. It is quite reasonable to imagine that a practical search for a deviating coalition
might employ a “greedy” method of iteratively killing the agent who seems to be least pulling
their weight at the current agreement; an insight of Theorem 3 is that this search heuristic
is in fact thorough and will provably produce the right answer.
1.4 Comparison with Prior Work.
Elliot and Golub [15] recently studied the Lindahl equilibria in public goods economies,
with a focus on characterizing the set of solutions rather than algorithmically comput-
ing/testing them. More specifically, they frame the typical model of public goods economies
in the language of networks, and use this to equate the eigenvectors of the “benefits network”
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with the Lindahl equilibria of the economy. A less general version of this networks inter-
pretation was implicitly used in several other papers concerning Nash equilibria of public
goods economies, for example [3, 5, 1, 2]. In this paper, we will adopt the more general
networks-based phrasing of public goods economies used by Elliot and Golub, and we will
rely on this insight in a critical way to prove our main results.
Per the discussion above, there has been lots of prior work on the algorithmic properties
of the core, largely intended to confirm/refute the bounded rationality argument in some
economic model. Three questions are commonly studied:
The membership testing problem (discussed above): is a given outcome in the core of the
game?
The emptiness testing problem: is the core empty?
The member finding problem: output any solution in the core of the game (if nonempty).
We remark that the latter two problems are already closed in public goods economies:
Elliot and Golub [15] show that the core is never empty except in certain degenerate cases,
and it can be seen from the model below that the member finding problem is essentially
identical to the general problem of convex optimization (which is well beyond the scope of
this economically-minded research program). Hence, this work is entirely focused on the
membership testing problem.
In order to frame these three questions as proper computational problems, past work has
commonly defined a “compressed” cooperative game that allows the payoffs achievable by all
2n possible coalitions to be expressed on only poly(n) input bits. For example, in a seminal
paper by Deng and Papadimitriou introducing this line of research [12], the authors studied
graphical games in which weighted edges are placed between agents and the value attainable
by a coalition is equal to the total weight contained in its induced subgraph. Upper and
lower bounds are often obtained for these problems by exploiting particular features of the
compression scheme. By contrast, our goal is to assume as little structure for the problem
as possible (since our main results are upper bounds, this is the more general approach).
Thus, we allow the economy to be governed by an arbitrarily complex utility function, which
does not need to have a succinct representation, or even any algorithmic representation at
all. Instead, we allow ourselves black-box constant-time query access to the utility function,
which acts as an oracle and thus may have arbitrary complexity. The goal in this substantial
generalization is to ensure that our results reveal structure of the core itself, rather than the
nature of an assumed compression.
2 The Model and Basic Definitions
2.1 Notation Conventions
Given vectors a,a′ ∈ Rn, we will use the following (partial) ordering operations:
a ≥ a′ means that ai ≥ a′i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
a > a′ means that ai > a′i for all i ≤ i ≤ n, and
a  a′ means that ai ≥ a′i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and aj > a′j for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Given a subset C ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a vector v ∈ Rn, we write vC to denote the restriction
of v to the indices in C; that is, vC is the |C| length vector built by deleting the entry vi
from v for each i /∈ C.
We use 0,1 as shorthands for the vectors 〈0, . . . , 0〉, 〈1, . . . , 1〉 respectively.
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2.2 Economic Model
We adopt the terminology of Elliot and Golub [15] when possible. The salient pieces of
our economy are defined as follows:
The set of agents in the economy is given by N = [n] = {1, . . . , n}. A nonempty subset
of agents in the economy C ⊆ N is called a coalition. The coalition C = N is called the
grand coalition.
Each agent i chooses an action ai, which can be any real number in the interval [0, 1].
An outcome or point is a vector a ∈ Rn built by concatenating the actions of all agents.
There is a continuous utility function u : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n, which maps outcomes to a
level of “utility” for each agent. In particular, agent i prefers outcome a to outcome a′
iff ui(a) > ui(a′). The utility function has the following two properties:
Positive Externalities: whenever a  a′ with ai = a′i, we have ui(a) > ui(a′). This
assumption is what places us in the setting of public goods economies; intuitively, it
states that an agent gains utility when other agents increase their production of public
goods.
Convex Preferences: we assume that u is concave.3 That is, for any outcomes a,a′
and any λ ∈ [0, 1], we have u(λa + (1− λ)a′) ≥ λu(a) + (1− λ)u(a′). This standard
assumption corresponds to the economic principle of diminishing marginal returns.
2.3 Game Theory Definitions
We recap some well-known definitions from the game theory literature.
I Definition 4 (Pareto Efficiency). An outcome a is a Pareto Improvement on another out-
come a′ if u(a)  u(a′). An outcome a is Pareto Efficient if there is no Pareto improvement
on a. The set of Pareto efficient outcomes is called the Pareto Frontier.
The main solution concept that will be discussed in this paper is the core:
I Definition 5 (Deviation). Given an outcome a, an outcome a′ is a deviation from a for a
coalition C if a′N\C = 0 and uC(a′) > uC(a).
I Definition 6 (The Core). An outcome a is in the core of the economy if no coalition has
a deviation from a (equivalently, a is coalitionally stable).
The next definition that will be useful in our proofs is the projected economy:
I Definition 7. Given an economy described by agents N and a utility function u, the
projected economy for a coalition C is the economy described by agentsN and utility function
uC(aC), where
uC(aC) := uC(aC · 0N\C).
In other words, the new |C|-dimensional utility function uC is obtained by fixing the actions
of N \ C at 0, allowing any action for C, and then using the old utility function u to
determine the utilities for C in the natural way. We suppress the superscript uC when clear
from context.
3 Confusingly, when u is mathematically concave, one says that preferences are “economically convex” –
hence, convex preferences.
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I Definition 8. The dominated set of a, denoted Da, is defined as:
Da := {a′ | u(a) ≥ u(a′)}
In other words, Da is the set of points that no agent prefers to a. Note that this is an
unusually weak definition of dominance, in the sense that (for example) Da contains a
itself.
3 A Topological Characterization of the Core
Our goal in this section is to prove the following structural theorem:
I Theorem 9. Let a be an outcome in a public goods economy. Then a is in the core if and
only if it is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and Da is path connected.
The vast majority of the technical depth of this theorem is tied up in the implication
a is in the core −→ Da is path connected.
The remainder of this forwards implication (a is in the core→ neither the grand coalition nor
any singleton coalition has a deviation from a) is extremely straightforward: a is individually
rational iff each agent i prefers it to the outcome they can guarantee acting alone, which
coincides with the notion that the singleton coalition {i} has no deviation from a. In
our model, Pareto efficiency coincides with the notion that the grand coalition N has no
deviation from a:
I Claim 1. Let a be an outcome. If there is an outcome a′ satisfying a  a′ (a  a′) and
u(a)  u(a′), then there is an outcome a′′ satisfying a > a′′ (a < a′) and u(a) > u(a′′).
Proof. We will prove the claim for the case a  a′; the case a  a′ follows from a symmetric
argument.
Choose an agent i for whom ui(a) > ui(a′), and then slightly increase ai. Since u is
continuous, if we increase ai by a sufficiently small amount then we still have ui(a) > ui(a′).
Additionally, by positive externalities we then have u(a) > u(a′). We can then slightly
increase the actions of all agents, such that a > a′, but with sufficiently small increases we
do not destroy the property that u(a) > u(a′). J
In this section, we will first give a complete proof of the (easier) backwards implication
of Theorem 9, and then we sketch the proof of the forwards implication. Due to space
constraints, a full proof of the forwards implication can be found in Appendix A.
3.1 Backwards Implication of Theorem 9
First:
I Lemma 10. If a is Pareto efficient, then every deviation a′ from a satisfies a′  a.
Proof. Let I be the set of agents i for which a′i > ai, and suppose towards a contradiction
that I is nonempty.
Consider the point a′′ defined such that a′′N\I := aN\I and a′′I := a′I . We then have
uN\I(a′′) > uN\I(a) by positive externalities, since these points differ only in that the
(nonempty) coalition I has increased their actions. We also have uI(a′′) ≥ uI(a′) > uI(a),
where the first inequality follows from positive externalities (since these points differ only in
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that the coalition N \ I has weakly increased their action), and the second follows from the
fact that a′ is a deviation from a for a coalition C with I ⊆ C (since aI > aI).
We thus have u(a′′) > u(a), which contradicts the fact that a is Pareto efficient. Thus
I is empty and the lemma follows. J
Second:
I Lemma 11. Suppose there is a path P ⊂ Rn≥0 with endpoints x,y such that for any p ∈ P
we have u(p) ≤ u(a). If a′ is a deviation from a for some coalition C satisfying a′  x,
then a′ also must satisfy a′  y.
Proof. We walk along P from x towards y until we find the first point p with pi = a′i 6= 0
for some i. If we reach y before we find any such point p, it follows that a′i = 0 or a′i < xi
for all i, and so a′  x, as claimed. Otherwise, we find such a point p, and we argue towards
a contradiction.
We have p 6= a′, since uC(a′)  uC(a) but uC(p) ≤ uC(a). By construction we then
have p  a′. Since pi = a′i, by positive externalities we then have ui(p) > ui(a′). Since
a′i 6= 0 we have i ∈ C, and since a′ is a deviation for C, this implies ui(a′) > ui(a). We then
have ui(p) > ui(a), which contradicts the assumption that u(p) ≤ u(a). Therefore no such
point p may be found. J
We can now show:
Proof of Theorem 9, Backwards Implication. Assume that a is robust to deviations by the
grand coalition or any singleton coalition, and that Da is path connected. Our goal is now
to show that a is in the core.
By Claim 1, the property that the grand coalition has no deviation from a implies that
a is Pareto efficient. Thus, by Lemma 10 any deviation a′ from a satisfies a′  a. Since no
singleton coalition has a deviation from a we have 0 ∈ Da, and since Da is path connected
there is a path contained in Da with endpoints a,a. Thus, by Lemma 11, we further have
that a deviation a′ must satisfy a′  0. Since no such point exists, it follows that no
deviations from a exist, and so a is a core outcome. J
3.2 Sketch of Forwards Implication of Theorem 9
We will denote by dvu(a) the one-sided directional derivative of u at a in the direction
v. In other words:
dvu(a) := lim
λ→0+
u(a + λv)− u(a)
λ
.
A nontrivial but standard fact from analysis is that, since u is concave and well-defined
everywhere, this limit is well-defined for all a, except when excluded by a boundary condition
(e.g. if vi < 0 but ai = 0 for some agent i) – see [24].
Our key lemma is:
I Lemma 12. At any outcome 0 < a < 1, exactly one of the following three conditions
holds:
1. There exist directions vup > 0,vdown < 0 such that dvup u(a) > 0 and dvdownu(a) < 0,
2. There exist directions vup > 0,vdown < 0 such that dvup u(a) ≤ 0 and dvdownu(a) ≤ 0,
or
3. There exist directions vup > 0,vdown < 0 such that dvup u(a) < 0 and dvdownu(a) > 0.
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The three categories of Lemma 12 carry a useful geometric intuition. Specifically:
I Lemma 13. The points in the second category of Lemma 12 are precisely the Pareto
Frontier.
The proofs of these two lemmas are quite technical, and can be found in Appendix A. With
these in mind, we define
I Definition 14. We will say that a point in the first category of Lemma 12 is below the
Pareto Frontier, and a point in the third category of Lemma 12 is above the Pareto Frontier
(and by Lemma 13, the second category of points in Lemma 12 are on the Pareto Frontier).
The geometric intuition behind this definition is that, starting from a point x in the first
category, one can continuously follow the gradient vup to eventually obtain a Pareto efficient
Pareto improvement x′ > x (we do not prove this fact formally; it is perhaps useful intuition
but not essential to our main results). Similarly, starting from x in the third category, we
can continuously follow the gradient vdown to obtain a Pareto efficient Pareto improvement
x′ < x.
We then show:
Proof Sketch of Theorem 9, Forwards Implication (Full proof in Appendix A). Suppose a
is a core outcome, and our goal is to show path connectedness of Da. First, we note that
0 ∈ Da, since otherwise a singleton coalition can deviate from a (and a is in the core, so
no such deviation is possible). To show path connectedness of Da, we consider an arbitrary
point x ∈ Da and construct a path in Da from x to 0, thus implying that any two such
points x,x′ ∈ Da have a connecting path in Da via 0.
We show the existence of the x 0 path with a careful repeated application of Lemma
12. Informally speaking, we progressively slide x > 0 a little bit closer to 0 while maintaining
the property x ∈ Da. If we ever hit xi = 0 for some agent i, then we restrict our attention to
the projected economy discluding agent i and continue. If we eventually exclude all agents in
this manner, then we have x = 0 and the process is complete. Otherwise, suppose towards
a contradiction that at some x, we cannot slide x any closer to 0 while maintaining x ∈ Da.
We make two observations here: (1) x must be above the Pareto frontier (else we could
slide x in the appropriate direction vdown) and so it belongs to the third; and (2) for all
agents i still being considered, we have ui(x) = ui(a) (else, by the positive externalities
assumption, we can unilaterally decrease the action of agent i without destroying x ∈ Da).
Hence, by moving x slightly in the direction vdown (which improves the utility of all agents
being considered), we have ui(x) > ui(a) for all agents being considered, and so the new x is
a deviation from a. Since we have assumed that a is a core outcome, this is a contradiction,
and so the process of sliding x towards 0 can never get stuck in this way. J
3.3 Connection to Lindahl Equilibria
Before proceeding towards our algorithm, we take a brief detour in this subsection to
observe an interesting implication of Theorem 9 that helps illustrate its broader appeal.
Elliot and Golub [15] show the following result:
I Theorem 15 ([15]). The Lindahl equilibria of a public goods economy with a differentiable
utility function are precisely the outcomes a for which dau(a) = 0.
They phrase this theorem in different language related to the “benefits network” of the
economy, but this formulation will suit our purposes better. We refer the reader to their
paper for a more in-depth discussion of the economic role of the Lindahl equilibria.
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Combining Theorem 15 with our machinery for Theorem 9, we obtain:
I Theorem 16. In a public goods economy with a differentiable utility function, the Lindahl
equilibria are precisely the core outcomes a whose membership can be certified by examining
only local information at a.
The proof of this theorem will use Theorem 15 as a black box, and so we will not actually
need to appeal to the formal definition of the Lindahl equilibria in its proof.
Proof. If a is a Lindahl equilibrium, then by Theorem 15 we have da u(a) = d−a u(a) = 0
(the first equality comes from the assumption that u is differentiable). We claim that any
a satisfying da u(a) = d−a u(a) = 0 is in the core, and thus its core membership can be
verified by examining only these local derivatives. First, note that a is Pareto efficient by
Lemma 13. Therefore, by Lemma 10, any possible deviation a′ from a satisfies a′  a. Now
let P be the line segment from 0 to a. By the assumption of concavity and the fact that
d−a u(a) = 0, we have u(p) ≤ u(a) for all p ∈ P . Thus, by Lemma 11, we have a′  0 and
so a′ cannot exist and a is a core outcome.
Now suppose that a is not a Lindahl equilibrium, and so d−a u(a) 6= 0. If we have
d−a u(a)  0, then we have da u(a)  0 (by differentiability) which implies that a is not
Pareto efficient, and hence is not a core outcome. On the other hand, suppose we have
d−a u(a)  0. In this case, it is impossible to distinguish u from the utility function u′ that
is affine-linear everywhere and agrees with u at a using solely local information. Note that
a is not in the core of the economy defined by u′, since we have ui(0) > ui(a) for whichever
agent i satisfies d−a ui(a) > 0. Thus, if a is in fact in the core of the economy defined by
u, we will need to inspect non-local information about the economy to differentiate u from
u′. J
We note that it is possible to prove Theorem 16 as a corollary directly from Theorem 9, but
this proof using the underlying machinery is simpler.
4 Algorithm for Testing Core Membership
Our main algorithmic result is:
I Theorem 17. Given an outcome a in a public goods economy, there is an algorithm (in
the real-RAM model) that decides whether or not a is in the core by solving O(n) convex
optimization problems and using O(n) additional computation time.
The algorithm is fairly straightforward. We maintain an “active coalition” CA through-
out, as well as a proof that any agent i /∈ CA must play action a′i = 0 in any deviation a′
from a. It is thus safe to assume that any deviating coalition C satisfies C ⊆ CA. Initially
CA ← N , so this invariant is trivially satisfied. After each round, we either find a deviation
for CA from a, or we remove one new agent from CA. Thus, if we make it n rounds without
finding a deviation, then we have CA = ∅ and so no deviation from a is possible.
4.1 Preprocessing: Confirm Pareto Efficiency of a
Before starting the main algorithm, we run the following two programs, with the purpose
of testing whether or not a is Pareto efficient.
I Program 1. Choose v to maximize min
i
dv ui(a)
Subj. to v ≥ 0,∑
i
vi = 1
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I Program 2. Choose v to maximize min
i
dv ui(a)
Subj. to v ≤ 0,∑
i
vi = 1
Note that the concavity of the optimized function f(v) := mini dv ui(a) is immediate from
the concavity of u. By Lemma 12, we may immediately conclude that a is not Pareto
efficient (and thus not in the core) iff either of these programs optimizes at a point v∗
satisfying f(v∗) > 0. Otherwise, we proceed with the knowledge that a is Pareto efficient.
A key advantage of this is that, by Lemma 10, we may now restrict our search for a deviation
a′ to the bounded box 0 ≤ a′ ≤ a. This opens up the ability to use convex programming
algorithms, which typically require bounded domains, in the remainder of the algorithm.4
4.2 Main Loop: Shrinking CA
Each of the n rounds of the algorithm consists of three steps. First, we restrict our
attention to the projected economy for the coalition CA. Second, we run the following
program:
I Program 3. Choose x to maximize min
i
ui(x)− ui(a)
Subj. to 0 ≤ x ≤ aCA
Let x∗ be a maximizing point of Program 3. We have:
I Lemma 18. Either uCA(x∗) > uCA(a) or uCA(x∗) ≤ uCA(a), and x∗ is Pareto efficient.5
Proof. First we argue Pareto efficiency. If x′ is a Pareto improvement on x∗, then by Claim
1 there is another point x′′ with u(x′′) > u(x∗). This x′′ would be a superior maximizing
point for Program 3, so there can be no Pareto improvement on x∗.
Next, let i := arg maxi ui(x∗)−ui(a) and j := arg minj uj(x∗)−uj(a). If ui(x∗)−ui(a) >
uj(x∗)−uj(a), then (by the same argument used in Claim 1) we can again obtain a superior
maximizing point x∗∗ by slightly increasing the action of agent i from x∗. Thus we have
ui(x∗)−ui(a) = uj(x∗)−uj(a), and it follows that either u(x∗) > u(a) or u(x∗) ≤ u(a). J
In the former case where u(x∗) > u(a), it follows that x∗ is a deviation from a for the
coalition CA, so we may halt the algorithm. Otherwise, we have u(x∗) ≤ u(a). We then
observe:
I Lemma 19. If uCA(x∗) ≤ uCA(a), then in the full (non-projected) economy, any deviation
a′ from a for a coalition C ⊆ CA satisfies a′CA  x∗.
Proof. The deviation a′ satisfies a′N\C = 0 and uC(a′) > uC(a) ≥ uC(x∗). It follows that
a′C is also a deviation for C from x∗ in the projected economy for CA. The claim is then
immediate from Lemma 10. J
One step remains. We run:
I Program 4. Choose v to maximize min
i
dv ui(x∗)
Subj. to v ≤ 0,∑
i
vi = 1
4 This detail is precisely why we use Programs 1 and 2 to check the Pareto efficiency of a, rather than the
ostensibly simpler method of searching for x∗ that maximizes mini ui(x∗) − ui(a): the latter method
requires a search for x∗ over an unbounded search space, which rules out many popular methods of
convex optimization that we wish to keep available.
5 Note that these statements hold specifically in the projected economy for CA.
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Let v∗ be a point that maximizes Program 4. We have
I Lemma 20.
dv∗ u(x∗) ≤ 0
The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 18, so we omit it for now. We then finally
have:
I Lemma 21. Let i := arg mini x∗i /v∗i . Then any deviation a′ from a has a′i = 0.
Proof. By Lemma 19, we have a′CA  x
∗. Let P be the line segment starting at x∗,
extending in the direction v∗ until a point p∗ is reached where p∗i = 0 for some agent i;
note that this will specifically be i = arg mini x∗i /v∗i . By concavity, all p ∈ P satisfies
u(p) ≤ u(x∗) ≤ u(a). Noting once again that a′CA is a deviation for C from x∗ in the
projected economy for CA, it follows from Lemma 11 that a′CA  p
∗, and so a′i = 0. J
With this in mind, the final step in the loop is to delete i from CA and repeat. After n
repetitions, we have CA = ∅, so we may halt the algorithm and report that a is in the core.
4.3 Algorithm Pseudocode
To recap the algorithm, which has been interspersed with proofs of correctness above,
we give full pseudocode here.
Algorithm 1: Testing Core Membership of a
1 Let v∗1 ← output of Program 1;
2 Let v∗2 ← output of Program 2;
3 if dv∗1 u(a) > 0 or dv∗1 u(a) > 0 then
4 return “a is not in the core” ;
5 end
6 CA ← N ;
7 while CA 6= ∅ do
8 x∗ ← output of Program 3;
9 if uCA(x∗) > uCA(a) then
10 return “a is not in the core” ;
11 end
12 v∗ ← output of Program 4;
13 CA ← CA \ {arg mini∈CA x∗i /v∗i };
14 end
15 return “a is in the core” ;
4.4 Conclusion: Adapting the Algorithm for Approximate Optimization
Our algorithm implies that core membership testing is efficient under any utility function
that admits quick solving of convex programs as described above. However, it may still be
desirable to test core membership as best as possible when the underlying utility function
is either unknown or badly behaved and so exact convex optimization is impossible. Our
algorithm can indeed be adapted to this effect, with a few significant points of caution, by
substituting in modern approximate optimization algorithms. Due to space constraints, we
include a discussion of this adaptation in Appendix B.
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A Remaining Proof of Theorem 9
A.1 Proof of Lemmas 12 and 13
We begin with some useful well-known technical claims. Proofs can be found in most
textbooks on analysis and/or combinatorics, see e.g. [24, 7].
I Claim 2. For any fixed a > 0, the function f(v) := dvu(a) takes values in Rn for all v
(i.e. the limit is well-defined and not infinite on all indices) and f is concave (which follows
from the assumption that u is concave).
I Claim 3. Any concave function f : Rn → R with domain restricted to a bounded subset of
Rn is Lipschitz continuous. That is, for any bounded domain D ⊂ Rn, there is a constant
KD such that for any v1,v2 ∈ Rn we have ‖f(v1)− f(v2)‖ ≤ KD · ‖v1 − v2‖.
I Lemma 22 (Sperner’s Lemma). Let S be an (n − 1)-simplex.6 Let T be a partition of S
into smaller (n− 1)-simplices (a “simplicization” of S), and color each point in S that is a
vertex of some sub-simplex T ∈ T by one of n colors. If there is no vertex on the face of S
opposite its ith vertex that is given color i, then there exists a “rainbow” simplex T ∈ T for
which the n vertices of T have all n possible colors.
I Lemma 23 (Cantor’s Intersection Theorem). Let {Xi} be an infinite sequence of nonempty
sets that are closed and bounded, with Xi ⊇ Xi+1 for all i. Then
⋂
i
Xi 6= ∅.
6 An (n−1)-simplex is an n−1 dimensional analogue of a triangle defined by n vertices; e.g. a 2-simplex
is a triangle, a 3-simplex is a tetrahedron, etc.
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We now proceed with some original observations:
I Claim 4. For any outcome a > 0, if there exists a direction v > 0 (v < 0) for which
dvu(a)  0, then there is no direction v′ > 0 (v′ < 0) for which dv′u(a) ≤ 0.
Proof. We will prove the claim for v,v′ > 0; the case where v,v′ < 0 follows from an
identical argument.
Let v > 0 such that dvu(a)  0, and let v′ > 0 be an arbitrary direction that is not
a scalar multiple of v. We can then find a vector x > 0 for which v + x = λv′ for some
scalar λ > 0, such that xi = 0 for some i. We have that (dvu(a))i > 0 (by hypothesis) and
(dxu(a))i > 0 (by the positive externalities assumption). Thus, by concavity of u, we have
(dv+xu(a))i > 0, and so (dλv′u(a))i > 0. Therefore we cannot have dv′u(a) ≤ 0. J
Now we are ready to show:
I Lemma 24 (Lemma 12 in the body of the paper). At any outcome a > 0, exactly one of
the following three conditions holds:
1. There exist directions vup > 0,vdown < 0 such that dvup u(a) > 0 and dvdownu(a) < 0,
2. There exist directions vup > 0,vdown < 0 such that dvup u(a) ≤ 0 and dvdownu(a) ≤ 0,
or
3. There exist directions vup > 0,vdown < 0 such that dvup u(a) < 0 and dvdownu(a) > 0.
Proof. First, we observe that Claim 4 implies that no a can satisfy two of these conditions
simultaneously: if a satisfies the first condition then there is no vup satisfying the latter two
conditions; if a satisfies the last condition then there is no vdown satisfying either of the
former two conditions. Thus, it suffices to show that each point a satisfies at least one of
these three conditions, and we immediately have that it satisfies exactly one of these three
conditions.
Second, by Claim 1, it suffices to show the existence of vup  0,vdown  0 satisfying
these conditions.
Now we begin the main proof. Let S be the (n− 1)-simplex in Rn with vertex set equal
to the n basis vectors {ei} (where ei ∈ Rn is the vector with a 1 in the ith place and a
0 elsewhere). If mini(ds u(a))i > 0 for any s ∈ S, then we have ds u(a) > 0. By convex
preferences we also have that vdown := −vup satisfies dvdownu(a) < 0, and so we may place
a into the first category of Lemma 12.
Otherwise, assume that mini(ds u(a))i ≤ 0 for all s ∈ S. In this case, our goal is to show
that there is vup with dvupu(a) ≤ 0. Assign each agent a color, and color each point s ∈ S
by the agent arg mini(ds u(a))i, breaking ties arbitrarily. Let Fi be the face of S opposite
ei; that is, Fi is the set of s ∈ S for which si = 0. Let f be any point in Fi. Note that, by
the assumption of positive externalities, we have (df u(a))i > 0; since we have assumed that
mini(df u(a))i ≤ 0, this implies that f is not colored by agent i.
Let T be a simplicization of S such that each simplex T ∈ T fits in a ball of radius ε, for
some ε > 0 that we will pick later. Since the face Fi does not include any points with color
i, we may apply Sperner’s Lemma (Lemma 22) to conclude that there is a simplex T ∈ T
whose n vertices {t1, . . . , tn} are rainbow (we assume without loss of generality that vertex
ti has color i). Let x be a point within distance ε of each vertex ti. Since (dtiu(a))i ≤ 0,
and since f(d) = dvu(a) is Lipschitz continuous on S (from Claims 2 and 3), it follows that
there is a constant KS independent of ε such that (dxu(a))i ≤ εKS for all i. In other words,
we have that u(x) ≤ εKS1, and so the set
Zλ := {s ∈ S | dsu(a) ≤ λ1}
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is nonempty for all λ > 0, since it contains x when we choose ε ≤ λKS .
Since the function f(s) = dsu(a) is continuous, Zλ for any λ > 0 is closed, bounded,
and nonempty. Thus, if we express the set
Z0 := {s ∈ S | dsu(a) ≤ 0} as Z0 =
⋂
λ>0
Zλ
then we see that Z0 is the intersection of a descending sequence of sets that are closed,
bounded, and nonempty. By Cantor’s Intersection Theorem (Lemma 23), Z0 is nonempty.
Note that any v ∈ Z0 satisfies v > 0, since if vi = 0 then by the positive externalities
assumption we have (dvu(a))i ≤ 0. We may thus take vup to be any element of Z0, and we
have vup > 0 and dvupu(a) ≤ 0.
We have now shown that there is a vector vup > 0 that satisfies either dvupu(a) > 0 or
dvupu(a) ≤ 0. By an exactly symmetric argument, we have that there is a vector vdown < 0
that satisfies either dvdownu(a) > 0 or dvdownu(a) ≤ 0. Thus, if dvupu(a) > 0 then we
may place a into the first category, if dvdownu(a) > 0 then we may place a into the last
category, and if neither of these are true then we simultaneously have dvupu(a) ≤ 0 and
dvdownu(a) ≤ 0 and so we may place a into the second category. J
I Claim 5. If there is a Pareto improvement a′ on an outcome a satisfying a′ 6 a, then
there is a Pareto improvement a′′ on a satisfying a′′ > a.
Proof. Let C be the largest set of agents for which a′C > a. If C is empty then we have
a′  a and we are done. Otherwise, suppose C is nonempty. Define the point amax such that
amaxj := max{a′i, ai} for all j. By positive externalities, we have uC(amax) ≥ uC(a′) ≥ uC(a)
(where the latter inequality follows from the fact that a′ is a Pareto improvement on a).
Also by positive externalities, we have uN\C(amax) > uN\C(a′). Thus, amax is a Pareto
improvement on a which satisfies amax  a. By Claim 1, we may further assume that
amax > a. J
I Lemma 25 (Lemma 13 in the body of the paper). The points in the second category of
Lemma 12 are precisely the Pareto Frontier.
Proof. It is clear that no outcome a in the first or third category of Lemma 12 is Pareto
efficient, since these points have a direction v for which dvu(a) > 0. Therefore the second
category in Lemma 12 contains the Pareto frontier. Let a be an outcome in the second
category, and suppose towards a contradiction that a′ is a Pareto improvement on a.
By Claim 5, we may assume that a′  a or a′  a; by Claim 1 we may assume more
strongly that a > a′ or a < a′. By concavity of u, we have that da′−au(a) > 0. There also
exist directions vup,vdown for which dvupu(a) ≤ 0 and dvdownu(a) ≤ 0. Since a′−a > 0 or
a′ − a < 0, we have a contradiction to Claim 4. Thus, there can be no Pareto improvement
a′ on a. J
A.2 Proof of Theorem 9
We assume that a is a core outcome. By definition this implies that the grand coalition
and singleton coalitions have no deviation from a. Thus, it only remains to show that Da
is path connected.
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I Claim 6. Let x be a point on the lower envelope of a path connected component of Da
(i.e. there is no point x′  x in this component).7 Then for some (possibly empty) set of
agents C ⊆ N , we have uC(x) = uC(a) and xN\C = 0N\C .
Proof. Define C to be the set of largest agents for which xC > 0C . By definition we have
xN\C = 0N\C , so we only need to prove that uC(x) = uC(a).
Suppose towards a contradiction that there is an agent i for whom xi > 0 and ui(x) <
ui(a). We can then modify x to a new point x′ by slightly decreasing the action of agent i.
Since u is continuous, if we make this decrease small enough then we still have ui(x′) < ui(a).
By positive externalities, we then have u(x′) < u(a). Since x′  x, this contradicts the fact
that x is on the lower envelope of its connected component. J
I Lemma 26. If a is a core outcome, then Da is path connected.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose Da is not path connected, and let D¯a be a
path connected component of Da that does not include 0, and let x be a point on the lower
envelope of D¯a. Let C be the smallest coalition such that uC(x) = uC(a) and xN\C = 0N\C
(the existence of such a coalition is given by Claim 6); note that x 6= 0 and so C is nonempty.
Now consider the projected economy for C. We have xC > 0C , so Lemma 12 applies to the
outcome xC in this economy.
Our next step is to figure out which of the three categories in Lemma 12 contains xC in
the projected economy. We observe that xC cannot fall into the first or second category of
Lemma 12. This holds because we would have vdown < 0 with dvdownu(a) ≤ 0, which means
that we can slightly decrease the actions of the coalition C in the original economy along the
direction vdown, giving a new point x′  x. By concavity of u, we still have u(x′) ≤ u(a)
and so x′ belongs to the same connected component of D¯a; this contradicts the assumption
that x is on the lower envelope of D¯a. Thus xC is in the third category of Lemma 12
in the projected economy, so there is a direction vdown < 0 with dvdownu(a) > 0. If we
move xC slightly in this direction vdown, we obtain an outcome x′C with uC(x′C) > uC(aC).
By setting x′N\C = 0, we then concatenate x′C and x′N\C to obtain a point x′, which is a
deviation in the original economy for the coalition C. J
B Adapting the Algorithm for Approximate Optimization
We conclude by discussing the feasibility of the algorithm on utility functions that are
either unknown or badly behaved, where exact convex optimization might not be easily
solvable. Here, one can use modern approximate convex optimization algorithms in the
place of the exact solutions assumed in the above algorithm. These algorithms query the
utility function and its derivatives at various points in the domain, ultimately finding a point
that comes within an additive ε of the optimal value. Their theoretical runtime is typically a
large polynomial in the dimensionality of the search space (n) but quite good in the accuracy
parameter (ε); for example, randomized center-of-gravity methods use O˜(n5 log(ε−1)) time
[6], leading to a runtime of O˜(n6 log(ε−1)) for our algorithm. Further improvements are
possible via more specialized optimization algorithms if one wishes to assume nice properties
for the utility function. If one does not wish to assume that the utility function derivatives
can be easily measured, these algorithms can be adapted to avoid this necessity, although
7 The existence of x follows straightforwardly from the fact that the path connected components of Da
are topologically closed (since u is continuous).
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at the cost of an additional factor of n [27]. For a general reference on convex optimization,
see [4].
Let us consider a natural relaxation in which the goal is to distinguish between core
outcomes and outcomes that are ε-far from being in the core (i.e. there is an “ε-deviation”
a′ from a satisfying uC(a′) > uC(a) + ε1 for the deviating coalition C). Two tweaks to the
algorithm/model will be needed to solve this relaxed problem with an approximate convex
optimization algorithm.
B.1 First Change: A Bounded Action Space
First, caution is needed in the preprocessing stage where the Pareto efficiency of a is
tested. It is no longer feasible to use the derivative-testing technique employed here in
Programs 1 and 2: the unbounded domain means that even a slightly positive entry in
the directional derivatives can translate to an indefinitely large Pareto improvement by
following this gradient out far enough. In other words, approximately negative directional
derivatives do not translate to approximately Pareto efficient points. Perhaps the most
natural workaround here is to simply enforce a bounded domain, i.e. assume that actions
lie in the interval [0, 1] rather than [0,∞). It seems fairly economically natural to assume a
maximum amount of possible work for each agent.
With this assumption in hand, we can actually skip the entire preprocessing phase and
move straight to the main loop where we iteratively shrink CA. The only purpose of the
processing phase in the original algorithm is to bound the deviation search space via Lemma
10; if we assume a bounded action space in the first place, it is no longer needed.
B.2 Second Change: Dependence on the Condition Number
The second change needed in the algorithm is that we must incurr an additional depen-
dence in runtime on the condition number of the economy
κ := max
v,x,i
dv ui(x).
This dependence comes from the interplay between Programs 3 and 4. To demonstrate
the issue, suppose we run Program 3 up to accuracy ε, returning a point x̂∗. We can
easily examine x̂∗ to distinguish the cases in which the current active coalition CA has an
ε-deviation versus no deviation at all. It is also quite straightforward to extend Lemmas
10 and 11. The trouble is that Lemma 20 breaks horribly; in particular, the vector v∗ ≤ 0
returned by Program 4 might not even approximately satisfy dv∗ u(x̂∗) ≤ 0.
We propose the following solution. First, we improve the accuracy of Program 3 from
ε to ε/(2κ), and again let x̂∗ be its output. Thus if x̂∗ is not a deviation, then there is no
ε/(2κ)-deviation from a for CA. Second, we begin an iterative process where we repeatedly
select an agent i where ui(x̂∗) ≤ ui(a) + ε/2, and we modify x̂∗ by decreasing the action
of agent i by ε/(2κ). Note that we now (quite generously) have ui(x̂∗) ≤ ui(a) + 2ε/3, and
we may repeat the process on a new agent. In the worst case, we may need to repeat this
process O(nκ/ε) times before an agent’s action reaches 0. However, we can halt the process
as soon as we slide x̂∗ to a point below the Pareto frontier, at which point we may simply
compute the appropriate downwards derivative by Program 4. We were unable to determine
if there actually exist utility functions in which the additional dependence of O(nκ/ε) will
actually be realized in most iterations of the algorithm.
